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Abstract
We study the reasons and conditions under which mediation is beneficial when
a principal needs information from an agent to implement an action. Assuming
a strong form of limited commitment, the principal may employ a mediator who
gathers information and makes non–binding proposals. We show that a partial rev-
elation of information is more effective through a mediator than through the agent
himself. This implies that mediation is strictly helpful if and only if the likelihood
of a conflict of interest is positive but not too high. The value of mediation depends
non–monotonically on the degree of conflict. Our insights extend to general models
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21 Introduction
On January the 17th, 1998 Saddam Hussein announces a halt to all UN weapons inspec-
tions in Iraq. During the following month all direct negotiations between the US and
Iraq end in vain and military action seems unavoidable. Yet, on February 20th the US
authorizes the UN secretary general Kofi Annan to fly to Iraq on a last–ditch mediation
effort, where he announces a deal with Bagdad. After a two–day review of the deal the
US accepts and strikes are averted. How come that the secretary general succeeded in
securing a deal that was not attainable in direct negotiations? How come that about 8
months later air strikes were launched after a new stand-off and mediation did not take
place? These are the questions that this paper addresses.
More generally, we are interested in the role of mediation in situations of conflict.
Casual observation suggests that mediators are often indispensable for settling conflicts
between sovereign nations and resolving labor disputes between employers and employees.
Also in every day life mediators play an important, albeit less formal role in defusing
many quarrels between family members, friends, and colleagues. Overall the popularity
of mediation is increasing. Smith (1995), for example, reports that in 1990 American
businesses started using mediation to resolve legal disputes. The increased interest in
mediation is also reflected in modern education. Nowadays mediation skills are taught
to sixth graders in elementary school and students at Harvard Law School.
We want to study the rationale behind mediation and are especially interested in the
circumstances under which institutions may arise that perform the role of mediators. This
paper focuses on a specific explanation for mediation: limited commitment in contracting.
Indeed, although the secretary general was sent with a highly restricted offer to Bagdad,
he still had some discretion over the final deal and the US needed two additional days
to review the final offer. In short, the US was not committed to the restricted offer of
Kofi Annan. This paper argues that it is this limited commitment power that renders
mediation profitable. Indeed, if full commitment had been available, the US could have
committed itself to behave just as Kofi Annan and therefore arrive at an identical deal.
The theoretical counterpart of this simple idea is the revelation principle in mechanism
design: With full commitment the party that offers the contract can imitate the behavior
of any other player and, hence, such players are not useful. Without such commitment
the revelation principle fails and additional players may alleviate contracting.
Since we focus on limited commitment as a potential beneficial source for mediation,
we perform our analysis in a model in which contractual commitment is simply impossible.
3More specifically, we contrast mediation to non–mediation in a model of cheap talk based
on Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which the uninformed party, the principal, has all
bargaining power. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which mediation
is strictly helpful to the principal. More importantly, we provide a straightforward and
general intuition for this result that applies to other settings in which the contractual
ability of the uninformed party is limited (e.g. Dewatripont 1986; Hart and Tirole 1988
and Laffont and Tirole 1988;1990; Bester and Strausz 2001):
The non–standard feature of contracting settings with limited commitment is that
from an ex ante point of view an uninformed principal may not want to obtain all infor-
mation from her agent. Rather, the principal is better off if she obtains only a partial
revelation of information. We show that a principal is more effective in obtaining a par-
tial revelation of information if she uses a mediator than if she communicates directly
with the agent herself. Partial revelation with direct communication requires that the
principal cannot uniquely identify the agent’s message with the agent’s private informa-
tion. Hence, the principal must receive messages in some stochastic way. Yet, if the
principal wants to induce the agent to perform this randomization, she must ensure that
the randomizing agent is kept indifferent between the allocations that his messages lead
to. This is not the case if the principal employs a mediator to perform the randomization
on part of the agent, because with a mediator a specific type of agent must only prefer
the mixture over allocations that is designed for him, but need not be indifferent between
the allocations over which the randomization occurs.1 Hence, with a mediator the prin-
cipal is less restricted in inducing a partial revelation of information and this may render
mediation beneficial.
We show that mediation is only helpful if the incentives between the conflicting par-
ties are partially aligned such that it is unsure whether a genuine conflict of interests
exists.2 We obtain three cases. First, if the ex ante probability of conflict is relatively
small, mediators are helpful in increasing the amount of information that is revealed in
equilibrium. In this case the mediator becomes more valuable as the ex ante probability
of conflict rises. Second, when the probability of conflict lies in an intermediate range,
the principal without a mediator would be unable to induce her agent to reveal any infor-
1Myerson (1985) and Forges (1986) already identified the function of the mediator as a garbling
device, but do not explain why the agents are unable to perform the garbling themselves by sending
messages randomly and under which circumstances this function may be helpful.
2Our results may therefore explain the observation of Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) that in a
two–sided bargaining setting mediation is ineffective, since in a bargaining setting the incentives of the
parties are diametrically opposed.
4mation. Yet, with the help of a mediator information revelation is possible and desirable
to the principal. Last, if the likelihood of a conflict is large, then even a mediator is
unable to induce information revelation in equilibrium. Hence, the value of mediation in
this range is zero. We show that the value of mediation changes continuously over the
three different regions and is non–monotonic in the degree of conflict.
Given that mediators may alleviate contracting, this paper has an important impli-
cation for the general theory of contracting with limited commitment. Our result implies
that in general contracting parties benefit from using a third party as a mediator. An
important question is therefore whether mediators should be included in the analysis
of optimal contracts. The existing literature (e.g. Laffont and Tirole 1988,1990, Dewa-
tripont 1986, Hart and Tirole 1988) excludes mediators from its analysis. Yet, since
contract theory intends to study how economic agents use contracts optimally, a con-
sideration of mediators seems natural: If contracting parties gain by using mediators,
there does not seem a reason why they will not do so.3 This line of reasoning leads to a
further observation. If mediation is generally helpful to contracting parties, then one may
expect the existence of economic institutions that play this role. For instance, the use
of mediation by American businesses to resolve legal disputes resulted in a completely
new type of services by so–called centers for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).4
Similarly, in Mitusch and Strausz (1999) we explain consultants as playing the role of
mediators in a situation of conflict within the firm. Apart from consultants, one may
use a similar argument to motivate the existence of lawyers as mediating between a pri-
vately informed defendant and the court and a regulatory agency as mediating between
a privately informed firm and a government susceptible to the ratchet effect.
2 Related Literature
Our result that mediation may be helpful is not new. Indeed, this paper combines and
contrasts two strands of literature: the contracting literature with limited commitment
(e.g. Laffont and Tirole 1988, 1991 and Hart and Tirole 1988) and the literature on
communication (e.g. Myerson 1985, 1986 and Forges 1986). It is therefore worthwhile to
review the similarities and differences between the two bodies of literature and to position
3The question is also relevant if one is only interested in the set of implementable allocations, as for
instance in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
4Brown and Ayres (1994) also emphasize the mediator’s role in controlling the flow of information.
Based on this idea they provide additional rationales for ADR.
5our own paper in relation to them. Both strands of literature study an implementation
problem in which the ex ante contracting possibilities are limited. In this sense the
literature on communication is more rigorous and excludes any form of commitment
before communication takes place. In contrast, the literature on contracting with limited
commitment allows still some limited form of contractual commitment. A further, more
pragmatic difference is that the literature on communication takes a rather abstract and
general approach, while the literature on contracting with limited commitment is much
more application driven.
The reason for these differences may be found in the different objectives and origins
of the theories. The literature on communication was developed to provide a general and
uniform framework to analyze the power of communication in games with multiple players
and multi–sided asymmetric information. Its generality was extended to repeated games
(Forges 1988) and multi–stage games with repeated acquisition of private information
(Myerson 1988). However, this literature does not address the exact nature of beneficial
mediation and its intuition. Hence, the added value of this paper with respect to the
communication literature is that we explicitly show how, why, and under what conditions
mediation facilitates communication.
Yet, both in its focus — delivering a positive explanation of existing institutions as
mediators — and its methodology — allowing the principal to optimize among contracts
and equilibria — the current paper is more related to contract theory. Overall the lit-
erature on contracting with limited commitment is more pragmatic than the literature
on communication, as it grew out of the concern that the standard theory of contract-
ing made unrealistic assumptions concerning the contract designer’s commitment. For
instance, Dewatripont (1986) noted that many ex ante optimal contracts tend to exhibit
ex post inefficiencies and argued that, in reality, contracting parties will renegotiate these
inefficiencies away. In the same vein Baker et al. (1999, p. 56) assert that “decision rights
in organizations are not contractible: the boss can always overturn a subordinate’s de-
cision, so that formal authority resides at the top.” This effectively results in a limited
commitment on part of the principal.
Directly related to the current paper is a recent paper by Krishna and Morgan (2004).
The authors study different forms of communication in the cheap talk setting of Crawford
and Sobel. In particular, they demonstrate that the use of multiple communication stages
enable players to reach outcomes that are Pareto superior to any outcome with a single
6stage of communication.5 Moreover, they also illustrate in a numerical example that
mediators may alleviate the cheap talk problem even further. With respect to Kishna
and Morgan (2004) the added value of the current paper is therefore to analyze the
mediator much more carefully and provide an intuition for its beneficial role. It is thereby
instructive to concentrate first on a single stage of communication. This restriction leads
to explicit conditions under which a mediator performs strictly better. Section 7 then
demonstrates that our results are robust when we allow for more stages of communication.
We will show this by providing an argument that is based on the recent work of Aumann
and Hart (2003).
3 Model and Preliminaries
Consider two players, a principal and an agent. The principal must implement an option
y ∈ IR, which affects both players. The effect of the implemented option y depends on
the state of the world on which the agent is privately informed. For simplicity, we assume
that the agent’s information may only take on two values. With probability 1 − pi he
possesses the information 1 and with probability pi ∈ (0, 1) his private information is 2.
We suppose that both players have each some preferred option y ∈ IR and the farther
the implemented option is from this preferred option the more they dislike it and increas-
ingly so. We capture this idea by assuming that the players have Von–Neumann Mor-
genstern utility functions which are strictly concave and attain a maximum on IR.6 The
utility functions depend on the private information of the agent. We write the principal’s
utility function as Vi(y) when the agent has the private information i = 1, 2. Similarly,
we denote agent i’s utility function as Ui(y). For technical reasons we assume that the
utility functions are well defined over IR and three times continuously differentiable.
Moreover, we adopt a monotonicity condition concerning the agent’s utility functions:
U ′1(y) < U
′
2(y) for all y ∈ IR.
The condition is similar to a standard sorting condition in screening models and will
fulfill a similar role. First of all, it implies that the preferred options of the agents
yai ≡ arg maxy Ui(y)
5Forges (1990) demonstrated the power of multiple communication stages in an example, while Au-
mann and Hart (2003) show that this is a general feature of games of communication.
6The model is similar to Crawford and Sobel (1982) with two types.
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Figure 1: An example
exhibit the ordering ya1 < y
a
2 . It implies further that if one agent is indifferent between
two distinct allocations y1 and y2, the other agent must have a strict preference. More
generally:
Lemma 1 For any y1 < y2 the following holds.
If U1(y1) ≤ U1(y2) then U2(y1) < U2(y2).
If U2(y1) ≥ U2(y2) then U1(y1) > U1(y2).
We denote similarly the principal’s preferred options by
ypi ≡ arg maxy Vi(y).
We make no explicit assumptions about the relation between V1(y) and V2(y), and hence
between yp1 and y
p
2, except that y
p
1 6= y
p
2 so that information about i is of interest for the
principal. Figure 1 illustrates the utility functions Ui and Vi for the ordering y
p
1 < y
a
1 <
ya2 < y
p
2.
This paper studies games of cheap talk. In such games the principal is unable to
commit to some implementation function ex ante.7 This distinguishes the current model
from standard principal agent models with adverse selection.8 As a consequence the im-
plemented option will in the end only depend on the beliefs of the principal concerning
7I.e., the principal is also unable to commit to any form of conditional payments.
8We have nevertheless chosen the connotation principal and agent rather than receiver and sender,
since we follow the standard approach of principal–agent theory and allow the principal to select among
different equilibria. Moreover, we give the principal all bargaining power in connection with the mediator.
8the agent’s private information. Since there exist only two possible types of private infor-
mation, these beliefs are fully described by some ρ ∈ [0, 1], representing the probability
that the agent is of type 2. Given a belief ρ, the principal implements
y(ρ) ≡ arg max
y
(1− ρ)V1(y) + ρV2(y).
The following lemma gives already some indication about the possible outcome and
will be helpful in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 2 For any belief ρ ∈ [0, 1] the option that the principal will choose, y(ρ), lies in
between yp1 and y
p
2, i.e.
min{yp1, y
p
2} ≤ y(ρ) ≤ max{y
p
1, y
p
2}.
Moreover, if yp1 < y
p
2, then y(ρ) is monotonic increasing. The function y(ρ) is monoton-
ically decreasing if yp1 > y
p
2.
4 Contractual Commitment
Before analyzing the cheap talk version of the model, it is helpful to analyze the model
as a standard mechanism design problem and assume that the principal can commit
contractually to a mechanism before she asks her agent for information. In this version
of our model the classical revelation principle applies and the optimal mechanism may
be found in the set of direct mechanisms that induce the agent to reveal his information
truthfully. Consequently, an optimal mechanism is the solution to the problem,
max
y1,y2
(1− pi)V1(y1) + piV2(y2)
s.t. U1(y1) ≥ U1(y2) (1)
U2(y2) ≥ U2(y1) (2)
where inequalities (1) and (2) represent the two incentive compatibility constraints. There
are no individual rationality constraints, as we assume that the principal must choose
some option and no outside option exists. Alternatively, one may assume that the outside
options are so low that they will not be binding, i.e. agent i’s outside option is smaller
than min{Ui(y
p
1), Ui(y
p
2)}.
The solution depends on the severity of the conflict of interest between principal and
agent. The following proposition identifies two extremes:
9Proposition 1 1. If yp1 > y
p
2, the pooling mechanism y1 = y2 = y(pi) is optimal.
2. If yp1 < y
p
2, U1(y
p
1) ≥ U1(y
p
2), and U2(y
p
2) ≥ U2(y
p
1), the optimal contract is the
principal’s first best (y1, y2) = (y
p
1, y
p
2).
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. In the first case, the incentive
problem between principal and agent is extremely severe. The two incentive compatibility
conditions (1) and (2) imply y1 ≤ y2. Yet, if y
p
1 > y
p
2, the principal prefers to set y1
greater than y2. The interests of the principal and agent are diametrically opposed and
the principal is unable to benefit from a separation of types. Taking the idea of a direct
mechanism literally, this result implies that it is optimal for the principal to commit not
to use the information which the agent’s message represents. That is, if yp1 > y
p
2, the
principal is unable to induce information revelation in a beneficial way.
On the other hand, when preferences fulfill the conditions of Proposition 1.2 we obtain
the other extreme. Here the principal can extract the agent’s information costlessly and
implement her first best, y1 = y
p
1 and y2 = y
p
2. In this setting the incentive problem is
trivial and there does not exist a genuine conflict of interest between agent and principal.
Proposition 1 has two important consequences concerning our analysis of beneficial
mediation. First, it shows that if yp1 > y
p
2 then even with contractual commitment a
principal cannot do better than offering a single, pooling contract y = y(pi). Obviously,
this must also hold if the principal is unable to commit to her option y, as with full
commitment she can imitate any behavior under non–commitment. Therefore, if yp1 > y
p
2,
the principal cannot benefit from employing a mediator. Second, if yp1 < y
p
2, U1(y
p
1) ≥
U1(y
p
2), and U2(y
p
2) ≥ U2(y
p
1), the principal has no ex post incentive to deviate from
the contractual implementation, yp1 resp. y
p
2, since it is her first best. Consequently,
also without commitment to y the principal will be able to implement it. Naturally,
the principal cannot do better than achieving her first best, and a mediator will not be
helpful. The two arguments lead to the conclusion that, under non–commitment, the
only remaining constellation in which the mediator may be helpful is when yp1 < y
p
2 and
when U1(y
p
1) < U1(y
p
2) or U2(y
p
2) < U2(y
p
1) holds. Hence, in the remainder of this paper
we will focus on this parameter constellation.9
Effectively, a type i for which Ui(y
p
i ) < Ui(y
p
j ) (j 6= i) prevents the principal from
achieving her first best. This observation motivates the following definition. We say
9Since we disregarded stochastic direct mechanisms, the previous argument is not completely exhaus-
tive in that, in the case yp
1
> yp
2
, the principal could possibly attain more by using stochastic mechanisms.
For completeness, we will therefore return to the case yp
1
> yp
2
and show for the non–commitment case
that with a mediator a pooling contract is indeed generally optimal.
10
that the interests of type i are incompatible with those of the principal if and only if
Ui(y
p
i ) < Ui(y
p
j ) (j 6= i). We will refer to such a type as incompatible.
Lemma 3 If yp1 < y
p
2, there exists at most one incompatible type.
Since Proposition 1 indicates that the question of beneficial mediation is uninteresting
if neither type is incompatible, we assume in the following that there exists an incom-
patible type. Given yp1 < y
p
2, Lemma 3 shows that due to the monotonicity condition,
there is at most one incompatible agent. We assume that this is type 2. This assumption
is without loss of generality, because if the incompatible type is type 1, then we may
“mirror” our problem by redefining the options as y′ = −y and exchange the roles of
type 1 and 2.
Assumption 1 The agent of type 2 is incompatible and yp1 < y
p
2.
Since only the incompatible type leads to a conflict, Assumption 1 implies that the
parameter pi measures the probability of conflict between the agent and the principal. In
order to arrive at a more intuitive classification of the ex ante probability of conflict, we
introduce two threshold levels pi1 ≥ 0 and pi2 ≥ 0. Let pii be such that
pii ≡ arg max
ρ∈[0,1]
{ρ|Ui(y(ρ)) = Ui(y
p
1)}.
Note that pi1 ≤ pi2 < 1, and that pii > 0 if and only if y
a
i > y
p
1. Figure 1 illustrates the
two thresholds for the case yp1 < y
a
1 < y
a
2 < y
p
2 with 0 < pi1 < pi2 < 1.
10
Given pi1 and pi2, we use the following classification of the ex ante probability of
conflict. We say that the ex ante probability of conflict is small if pi < pi1 and that the
ex ante probability of conflict is large if pi > pi2. Note that if y
a
1 ≤ y
p
1 then there does
not exist a small ex ante probability of conflict, because in this case pi1 = 0. Likewise, if
ya2 ≤ y
p
1 then pi2 = 0 and any pi represents a large probability of conflict.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds, then the optimal separation contract ex-
hibits y1 < y
p
1 and y2 < y
p
2, and leaves agent 2’s incentive constraint binding.
If type 2 is incompatible, the principal’s first best is not attainable, since it vio-
lates type 2’s incentive constraint. Yet, for yp1 < y
p
2 the requirements of the incentive
constraints, that y1 ≤ y2, are nevertheless aligned with the principal’s preferences. In
10The other two possible cases are ya
1
≤ yp
1
< ya
2
< yp
2
with pi1 = 0 < pi2 < 1 and y
a
1
< ya
2
≤ yp
1
< yp
2
with pi1 = pi2 = 0.
11
contrast to the case yp1 > y
p
2, the principal may therefore prefer a separation contract to a
pooling one. The optimal separation contract requires that y1 and y2 are smaller than y
p
1
and yp2 respectively. The choice of y2 < y
p
2 is intuitive: Starting from the first best (y
p
1, y
p
2)
—which violates type 2’s incentive compatibility constraint (2)— lowering y2 relaxes the
constraint. At first sight it may be surprising that it is optimal to set y1 below y
p
1, since a
y1 lower than y
p
1 reduces the principal’s utility from a truthful revelation of type 1. Yet,
starting from the principal’s first best this loss is only of the second order, since yp1 is the
optimal restructuring choice under type 1, i.e. V ′1(y
p
1) = 0. In contrast, a y1 lower than
yp1 relaxes type 2’s incentive constraint, which represents a first order gain.
Concerning our question of beneficial mediation, Proposition 2 reveals two important
features of the optimal separation mechanism. First, the options prescribed by the opti-
mal revelation contract are suboptimal ex post. Since the agent reveals himself perfectly
by his choice of contract, the principal will have an ex post incentive to implement the
options yp1 and y
p
2 rather than the options prescribed by the mechanism. The credibil-
ity of the principal’s commitment is therefore crucial. In the cheap talk version of our
implementation game there is no such commitment and the ex ante incentives to report
truthfully are destroyed.
Second, the optimal information revealing mechanism commits the principal to an
option y1 < y
p
1. Yet, Lemma 2 established that there does not exist a belief for the
principal that would lead to such a choice. Therefore, when the principal has no possibility
to commit herself, she would never take this option. In the cheap talk version of the
model the principal can therefore not achieve the outcome of the optimal separation
mechanism. As this result is independent of whether the principal uses a mediator, it
shows that we cannot expect the mediator to mitigate completely the limitations due to
a lack of commitment of the principal.
5 Direct Communication
In the following we assume that the principal is unable to commit to a mechanism. This
transforms the implementation problem into a game of cheap talk in which the principal
cannot propose a menu from which the agent may pick his preferred option. Nevertheless,
the principal may want to communicate with her agent in the hope that this leads to
some revelation of information.
In this section we assume that communication must take place directly between prin-
12
cipal and agent. The direct communication game is as follows:11
1. The principal sets some message space M for the agent.
2. The agent announces a message m ∈ M .
3. The principal updates her beliefs.
4. The principal chooses an option y.
We apply the solution concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) to this game.
Such an equilibrium specifies a message space M , an announcement strategy αi for the
agent, a belief ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρ|M |) of the principal, and an implementation strategy y =
(y1, . . . , y|M |). That is, if the agent sends the message m ∈ M , the principal’s belief
that the agent is of type 2 is ρm and induces her to implement restructuring option ym.
Since we are interested in the question whether the principal can do strictly better with
a mediator than without, we will concentrate on the PBE that yields the principal the
highest utility.12
Due to a generalized revelation principle proven in Bester and Strausz (2001), we
may without loss of generality assume that the message space corresponds to the set of
types, i.e. M = {1, 2}. This implies that the agent effectively announces some type i.
Consequently, we may represent a strategy of agent i by some αi ∈ [0, 1] which denotes
the probability that the agent announces that he is of type 1. Moreover, there is no loss
of generality in assuming that α1 > 0, α2 < 1, and α1 ≥ α2.
13
Thus we will look for a PBE with M = {1, 2}. The combination (α1, α2, ρ1, ρ2, y1, y2)
constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if it satisfies the following three conditions:
1. The agent’s announcement strategy is optimal given the principal’s implementation
strategy, i.e.
αiUi(y1) + (1− αi)Ui(y2) = max
α
αUi(y1) + (1− α)Ui(y2). (3)
11We first restrict attention to a single stage of direct communication. See Section 7 for a discussion
of this assumption.
12It is well known that in cheap talk games there always exists an uninformative “babbling” equilibrium
yielding no information revelation.
13This implies that the agent tells the truth with a strict positive probability, but, in contrast to the
standard revelation principle, it may be optimal for the principal to let some type lie with a positive
probability. For more details see Bester and Strausz (2001).
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2. The principal’s belief is Bayes’ consistent with the agent’s strategy, whenever pos-
sible. This implies that
ρ1 = ρ(α1, α2) and ρ2 = ρ(1− α1, 1− α2),
with
ρ(x1, x2) ≡
x2pi
x1(1− pi) + x2pi
. (4)
Note that since α1 ∈ (0, 1] and α2 ∈ [0, 1) both ρ(α1, α2) and ρ(1− α1, 1− α2) are
well–defined.
3. The principal’s implementation strategy is optimal given her belief p, i.e.
yi = y(ρi).
In equilibrium, the agent’s strategy combination (α1, α2) yields the principal the util-
ity
V (α1, α2) = (1− pi)[α1V1(y(ρ(α1, α2))) + (1− α1)V1(y(ρ(1− α1, 1− α2)))]
+ pi[α2V2(y(ρ(α1, α2))) + (1− α2)V2(y(ρ(1− α1, 1− α2)))].
The principal’s utility is increasing in α1 and decreasing in α2.
14 This reflects the intuitive
fact that more information is better for the principal. Since the principal’s utility depends
on the degree of information the agent reveals, it will be helpful to distinguish between
the following five classes of equilibria:
1. A full revelation equilibrium in which the agent’s type is perfectly revealed: α1 = 1,
α2 = 0.
2. A non–revelation equilibrium in which the agent’s announcement does not reveal
anything: α1 = α2.
3. A partial revelation equilibrium in which the announcement of each agent reveals
some, but not all information: α1 < 1, α2 > 0, and α1 6= α2.
4. A type 1 partially full revelation equilibrium that leads to a full revelation of agent
1 with positive probability, but not of agent 2: α1 < 1 and α2 = 0.
14The envelope theorem yields dV/dα1 = (1 − pi)(V1(y1) − V1(y2)) ≥ 0 and dV/dα2 = −pi(V2(y2) −
V2(y1)) ≤ 0. The sign follows due to α1 ≥ α2, which implies y1 = y(ρ(α1, α2)) ≤ y2 = y(ρ(1−α1, 1−α2))
in equilibrium.
14
5. A type 2 partially full revelation equilibrium that leads to a full revelation of agent
2 with positive probability, but not of agent 1: α1 = 1 and α2 > 0.
Under Assumption 1 a full revelation equilibrium does not exist. In such an equilib-
rium the principal chooses yp1 and y
p
2, which leads agent 2 to pool with agent 1 rather
than revealing himself truthfully. As is familiar from the literature on cheap talk, a non–
revelation equilibrium always exists, but yields the principal less than any other class
of equilibrium. Any of the remaining classes involves at least one message that reveals
the agents only partially, which requires that both agents use this message with positive
probability. The agent who uses also the other message is actively mixing over the two
messages and must therefore be indifferent between the allocations which they induce.
Due to the monotonicity assumption the two agents cannot be indifferent between two
different allocations at the same time. Hence, a partial revelation equilibrium will not
exist.
Now consider the two partially full revelation equilibria. A type i partially full revela-
tion equilibrium implies yi = y
p
i and requires, first, that agent i is indifferent between y
p
i
and the other option yj 6= y
p
i (j 6= i) while, second, agent j always prefers yj so that he
reveals himself truthfully. First consider the type 2 partially full revelation equilibrium.
It implies yp1 < y1 < y2 = y
p
2 and requires that agent 2 is indifferent between y1 and y
p
2.
However, under Assumption 1 agent 2 is incompatible, which implies that in the range
[yp1, y
p
2 ] the outcome y
p
2 is his worst possible outcome. Therefore, he will strictly prefer
any y1 ∈ [y
p
1, y
p
2) and an equilibrium of class 5 does not exist.
Hence, under Assumption 1 the only remaining candidate besides the non–revelation
equilibrium is an equilibrium of class 4 which leads to a full revelation of type 1 with
positive probability. This equilibrium implies y1 = y
p
1 < y2 < y
p
2 and requires that agent 1
is indifferent between the allocation yp1 and a different allocation y2. This is only possible
if ya1 > y
p
1. Hence, if pi1 = 0 only the non–revelation equilibrium exists. On the other
hand, if pi1 > 0, the concavity of the agent’s utility function implies that there exists
exactly one restructuring option y2 > y
p
1 for which this indifference obtains. Namely,
y(pi1), as illustrated in Figure 1. The equilibrium therefore exists if there exists a mixing
behavior of agent 1 which leads to the belief pi1 upon observing the message 2. Bayes’
consistent updating implies that this is the case if and only if the ex ante probability of
conflict is small, i.e., pi < pi1. We therefore arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the optimal Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium with direct communication exhibits the following structure:
15
1. If pi < pi1, the optimal PBE is (y1, y2) = (y
p
1, y(pi1)) and agent 1 is perfectly revealed
with probability (pi1 − pi)/((1− pi)pi1) > 0.
2. If pi ≥ pi1, the optimal PBE is (y1, y2) = (y(pi), y(pi)) and no information is revealed
in equilibrium.
A direct comparison between Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 reveals that non–
commitment not only makes it more difficult for the principal to induce information
revelation, it may actually make it impossible. Only if the ex ante probability of a con-
flict of interest is small (pi < pi1), is the principal able to extract information from the
agent. But also in the informative equilibrium there remain three sources of inefficiencies
as compared to the commitment case. First, the allocation y1 is suboptimally high, as
without commitment it is not possible for the principal to implement an option y < yp1.
Second, there is a “stochastic misallocation”, since agent 1 misrepresents his type with
positive probability. Third, the allocation y2 is suboptimally low as compared to the
solution under full commitment. The latter two inefficiencies have the same origin: In
order to induce agent 1 to mix, the principal must make him indifferent between the
two equilibrium outcomes. Stochastic misallocation is therefore a necessary feature for
information revelation under non–commitment and, in contrast to the full–commitment
case, agent 1 rather than agent 2 is made indifferent in equilibrium.
An interesting interpretation of the solution is what may be called an “underrevela-
tion principle”: In equilibrium information revelation is only possible if the compatible
type, who has no problem to reveal himself when the principal offers her two preferred
options, underreveals himself. The imperfect revelation of type 1 provides cover for the
incompatible type 2, making information revelation possible. In fact, inducing type 1 to
provide such cover for agent 2 is the principal’s main problem. She has to choose her op-
tion y2 in such a way, that type 1 is indeed willing not to reveal himself completely. Since
her choice y2 has to be Bayesian incentive compatible, it limits the amount of information
that can be revealed in equilibrium and restricts the set of parameter constellations for
which the principal can induce information revelation.
6 Mediated Communication
In this section we allow the principal to employ a third party, the mediator, who may
help with the communication between principal and agent.15 The mediator’s role is to
15In contrast to standard models of third–party delegation, the principal in our framework does not
delegate the final implementation decision. It should be clear that this makes the role of the third party
16
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Figure 2: A communication rule
communicate first with the agent and then with the principal. Since the principal employs
the mediator, we assume that she designs the exact rules of communication. A general
communication rule prescribes the following. First, it specifies a message space M1 from
which the agent has to send a message to the mediator. Second, it specifies a message
space M2 from which the mediator sends a message to the principal. Third, it specifies
the probability with which the mediator sends a message m2 ∈ M2 when the agent sent
the message m1 ∈ M1. A communication structure P may therefore be written as a tuple
(M1,M2, α) where α maps M1 into a probability distribution over M2. Figure 2 illustrates
a communication rule with two messages for the agent and two for the mediator.
The game between the principal and the agent when a mediator is available runs as
follows:
1. The principal announces publicly the mediator’s communication rule P = (M1,M2, α).
2. The agent sends a message m1 ∈ M1 to the mediator. The message is communicated
in private such that the principal does not observe it.
3. The mediator sends the message m2 ∈ M2 according to the probability distribution
α(m1) to the principal.
4. The principal updates her beliefs and decides which project to implement.
Note that the principal’s choice of a communication rule P at stage 1 induces a proper
subgame as of stage 2. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this subgame describes for each
type of agent an announcement strategy, which may be represented by a probability dis-
tribution over the set M1, and an implementation strategy for the principal that describes
much weaker. In line with standard literature on delegation, we assume that there exist no possibilities
of collusion.
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which option y ∈ IR the principal chooses given the mediator’s message. In principle also
the principal’s strategy may involve randomization. Last, a Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium describes a belief function ρ for the principal, which represents the belief of the
principal given that the mediator sent a message m2 ∈ M2. Similarly to the previous
section, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium has to satisfy three requirements: 1) the agent’s
announcement strategy is optimal given the principal’s implementation strategy; 2) the
principal’s belief is Bayes’ consistent with the agent’s strategy, whenever possible; and 3)
the principal’s implementation strategy is optimal with respect to her beliefs.
Importantly, the mediator’s description coincides with his role in the literature on
communication. The following lemma expresses an important result of this literature.
Lemma 4 Without loss of generality the principal may restrict attention to communica-
tion rules for which the message of the agent is his type and the message to the principal
is a recommendation about the option y. Moreover, the principal may restrict attention
to communication rules that are (Bayesian) incentive compatible, i.e., induce the prin-
cipal to follow the mediator’s recommendation and induce the agent to report his type
truthfully.
Lemma 4 is a generalized version of the classical revelation principle.16 It shows that
one may assume without loss of generality that the optimal communication rule uses a
message space M1 = {1, 2} for the agent and the message space M2 = IR for the mediator.
That is, we may restrict attention to communication rules which give an intuitive role to
the mediator and is consistent with standard observation of mediation in real–life: The
mediator first gathers information during private consultations and then makes a public
proposal.
Due to the revelation principle we have only to consider incentive compatible commu-
nication rules P = ({1, 2}, IR, α1, α2) with αi a probability measure over IR. To circumvent
measure–theoretical considerations we restrict attention to the class of communication
rules that randomize over a finite, but arbitrarily large number of recommendations in IR.
That is, we consider communication rules of the form P = ({1, 2}, R, α1, α2) with R ⊂ IR
finite and αi ∈ IR
|R|
+ and
∑|R|
j=1 αij = 1 for i = 1, 2. Without further loss of generality we
adopt the following ordering assumption
α2(j+1)α1j ≥ α1(j+1)α2j (5)
for all j = 1, 2, . . . , |R| − 1.
16For details see Myerson (1985, 1986) and Forges (1986).
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An incentive compatible communication rule entails two different forms of incentive
compatibility. First, the recommendations must be incentive compatible in the sense
that the principal has no strict incentive to diverge from the mediator’s proposal. For a
recommendation rj ∈ IR this obtains if
rj = y(ρ(α1j, α2j)) (6)
where ρ(·) is given by (4) and ensures Bayes’ consistent updating. We call a recom-
mendation rj for which equality (6) holds incentive compatible. Under Assumption 1
y(ρ) is increasing and the ordering condition (5) implies that an incentive compatible
communication rule exhibits rj ≤ rj+1 for all j = 1, 2, . . . , |R| − 1.
Second, the communication rule must be incentive compatible in the sense that the
agent does not have a strict incentive to misreport his type. A communication rule P is
incentive compatible with respect to type 1 if
∑
j
α1jU1(rj) ≥
∑
j
α2jU1(rj). (7)
A communication rule P is incentive compatible with respect to type 2 if
∑
j
α2jU2(rj) ≥
∑
j
α1jU2(rj). (8)
A communication rule P is incentive compatible if all its recommendations are incen-
tive compatible and if it is incentive compatible with respect to both types. As is well
known, the need for incentive compatibility puts restrictions on the set of implementable
communication rules:
Lemma 5 Suppose Assumption 1. If an incentive compatible communication rule P
induces some revelation of information then
1. it holds pi < pi2.
2. if one type’s incentive constraint holds with equality, the other one’s is satisfied
with strict inequality.
3. there must be recommendations rj ∈ R such that y(pi) < rj < y
p
2.
Lemma 5 shows in particular that if the ex ante probability of conflict is large
(pi ≥ pi2), information revelation is impossible. In this case the principal does not ben-
efit from the mediator. Given this result we proceed by showing that a mediator is
indeed helpful if the probability of conflict is not large. We thereby focus first on in-
centive compatible 2–proposal rules for which the number of proposals to the principal
19
coincides with the number of types. An incentive compatible 2–proposal rule has the
form P = ({1, 2}, {r1, r2}, (α11, α12), (α21, α22)) and is illustrated in Figure 2. The or-
dering assumption (5) implies α11 ≥ α21, i.e. the recommendation r1 (weakly) indicates
that the agent is of type 1, while the recommendation r2 is more indicative of type 2.
Moreover, using αi2 = 1− αi1, the incentive compatibility conditions with respect to the
agents, (7) and (8), reduce to
U1(r1) ≥ U1(r2) and U2(r2) ≥ U2(r1), (9)
respectively. Note that these constraints coincide with the incentive compatibility con-
ditions (1) and (2) of the full commitment framework. The incentive compatibility con-
ditions with respect to the principal are given by (6) for j = 1, 2. Given these incentive
constraints an optimal incentive compatible 2–proposal rule is a solution to the following
maximization problem:
max
α11,α21,r1,r2
V (P ) ≡ (1− pi){α11V1(r1) + (1− α11)V1(r2)}
+ pi{α21V2(r1) + (1− α21)V2(r2)}
s.t. (6) and (9).
In order to derive the optimal proposal rule it is helpful to introduce the following
definition of informativeness.17 Consider two incentive compatible proposal rules in which
all recommendations except for two of them are identical, i.e. with identical (α1j, α2j) for
all j 6= k, l. We say that a proposal rule that includes the pair (r′k, rl) is more informative
than a proposal rule that includes the pair (rk, rl) if |r
′
k− rl| > |rk− rl|. This definition is
motivated by incentive compatibility, since the distance between rk and rl is larger only
if these recommendations are more discriminative between the two types.
Lemma 6 The principal’s utility is increasing in the informativeness of an incentive
compatible recommendation pair (rk, rl).
Lemma 6 shows that our notion of informativeness is consistent with the intuitive
idea that more information is better for the principal. Yet, the result is not trivial, since
increasing informativeness has both a positive and a negative effect. Clearly, a more
informative recommendation enables the principal to tailor her options more accurately.
A negative effect, however, is caused by the need for incentive compatibility. If a pair
17Note that this definition and the following Lemma 6 hold for general proposal rules, not only 2–
proposal rules, and provides the basis for all the optimality results derived in this paper (in particular
Propositions 4 and 5).
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(r′k, rl) is more informative than a pair (rk, rl), then incentive compatibility requires that
both types induce the recommendation rk less often. That is, also the type of agent for
which recommendation rk is indicative. This is a negative effect. Lemma 6 shows that
due to the concavity of Vi the positive effect outweighs the negative one.
Having established that more informative, incentive compatible recommendations are
beneficial, we are able to derive the optimal 2–proposal rule in the case that the ex ante
probability of conflict is not high.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 and pi < pi2. The optimal incentive compatible
2–proposal rule is (y1, y2) = (y
p
1, y(pi2)). The incentive constraint of agent 2 binds and
agent 1 is perfectly revealed with probability (pi2 − pi)/((1− pi)pi2) > 0.
The optimal 2–proposal rule resembles the equilibrium of the game with direct com-
munication. In both equilibria the incompatible agent is not fully revealed. More impor-
tantly, also the compatible agent 1 is not revealed completely, but pools with a positive
probability with the incompatible type. Even though he is the compatible, unproblematic
type from the principal’s perspective, his type is underrevealed in order to provide cover
for the incompatible agent so that this latter agent is never fully exposed.
The important difference between the two equilibria is that the degree of underrev-
elation of type 1 is less when the principal uses a mediator. This difference constitutes
the beneficial effect of the mediator. He is able to provide cover for agent 2 more ef-
ficiently and thereby attain more informative allocations than the principal. Yet, type
2’s incentive constraint restricts the mediator in inducing information revelation and the
constraint is binding at the optimum.18
Since Lemma 5 shows that for pi > pi2 mediators are not helpful to the principal, we
arrive at our main result.19
Theorem 1 Mediation is strictly beneficial to the principal if and only if the following
conditions hold: (i) yp1 < y
p
2, (ii) type 2 is incompatible, and (iii) pi ∈ (0, pi2).
18Note the similarity with the optimal full–commitment contract.
19For completeness, we show in the appendix that for yp
1
> yp
2
, the mediator is unable to induce
information revelation with a general communication rule. Hence, the equilibrium outcome coincides with
the pooling equilibrium outcome, as already indicated by Proposition 1 (see also footnote 9). Moreover,
if a mediator is unable to induce information revelation for yp
1
> yp
2
, then this necessarily also holds with
direct communication, since a mediator may mimic any equilibrium of the direct communication game.
21
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Figure 3: The value of mediation
We may explain the beneficial effect of the mediator by referring to the equilibrium
requirement (3) of direct communication and the incentive constraints (9) of mediated
communication. The principal’s utility is increasing in the amount of information that
is revealed. Due to her limited commitment, however, the principal is unable to induce
full information revelation and can achieve at most a partial revelation of information by
inducing an underrevelation of the compatible type. Without mediation underrevelation
requires that the compatible type actively mixes over his messages. To induce such
mixing, he must be kept indifferent between the two allocations. This is expressed by
the equilibrium requirement (3). In contrast, with a mediator the agent’s indifference is
not required. Since the mediator performs the mixing, the compatible agent only has to
prefer his mixing package over the mixing package of the other type. This requirement
yields the incentive constraints (9), which are weaker than the equilibrium requirement
(3).
The Theorem shows that the benefit of mediation depends on the ex ante probability
of conflict pi. Figure 3 illustrates this result graphically by drawing the principal’s payoff
associated with the optimal unmediated contract, V D, and the optimal mediated contract,
V M . It demonstrates that, at low probabilities of conflict, both payoffs decrease, whereas
they rise for larger values of pi. The reason for this non–monotonicity is that the parameter
pi affects the amount of asymmetric information between the principal and agent in a
non–monotonic way. For low values of pi an increase raises the amount of asymmetric
information, whereas for high values of pi the degree of asymmetric information is reduced.
At the extremes pi = 0 and pi = 1 there is no asymmetric information so that V D and
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V M coincide. More importantly however, the Figure shows that, starting from pi = 0,
the decrease in the principal’s payoff is stronger, if she does not use a mediator. This
reflects that a principal is in a better position to deal with asymmetric information when
she uses a mediator. In this case, a rise in the amount of asymmetric information hurts
the principal less.
By introducing the difference W ≡ V M−V D we may discuss the value of mediation to
the principal. The figure illustrates that as a function of pi the value W is hump–shaped
and attains a unique maximum.20 Considering that mediators are costly to employ in
real life, this typical shape of W has an important empirical implication. With costly
mediation, the interval of pi in which mediation is beneficial shrinks from both sides.
Hence, if mediators are costly and the probability of conflict is quite low, the principal
does not resort to a mediator, but relies on direct communication. Consequently, one
would see mediation only for intermediate levels of pi, i.e. in situations in which the
probability of conflict is neither too high nor too low. These two implications seem
consistent with stylized facts about mediation and are testable empirically.
7 More General Forms of Communication
In the preceding sections we analyzed optimal communication under two restrictions. On
the one hand, we allowed the principal and agent to communicate for only one round. On
the other hand, we allowed the mediator to choose between only two recommendations
to the principal. A priori it is however not clear whether these assumptions imply real
restrictions or whether they can be made without loss of generality. This section addresses
this question. We first turn to our restriction on mediation.
Allowing more than two recommendations leads to an artificial randomness of the
communication rule. From standard theory of mechanism design it is well known that
artificial randomness may relax incentive constraints and may therefore be part of an
optimal mechanism even when players are risk averse. This result extends to our setting
with limited commitment and prevents a simple characterization of the optimal contract.
Instead, the following partial characterization of the optimal communication rule may be
obtained.
20Straightforward calculations show that W is strictly concave on [pi1, pi2]. If pi1 > 0, it is linearly
increasing on [0, pi1]. Consequently, W s quasi–concave in pi and has a unique maximum.
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Proposition 5 Suppose the necessary and sufficient conditions of Theorem 1 for benefi-
cial mediation are met. Then an optimal communication rule has the following properties:
(i) Agent 2’s incentive constraint (8) binds.
(ii) It holds r1 = y
p
1.
(iii) For all j > 1 it holds rj > max{y(pi), y
a
2}.
Property (ii) implies that agent 1 is revealed with a probability strictly between zero
and one. On the other hand, property (iii) implies that all recommendations except r1
are more indicative of agent 2 than of agent 1.
Reflecting the fact that stochastic schemes may be optimal, we cannot exclude that the
optimal communication rule uses more than two recommendations. However, a standard
approach in implementation theory is to derive sufficient conditions on the risk attitudes
of the parties that render stochastic mechanisms suboptimal. Naturally, these conditions
regard the parties whose incentive constraints bind at the optimum. Since in the present
model there exist incentive constraints with respect to the agent as well as to the principal,
the conditions involve the risk attitudes of both parties. The following proposition shows
that if the principal’s utility function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion and the
combined absolute risk aversion of principal 1 and type 2 concerning the option y is large
enough the optimal rule does not involve artificial randomness.21
Proposition 6 Given the conditions of Theorem 1, a sufficient condition for a 2–proposal
rule to be optimal is that V ′′′i ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2 and for all y ∈ (y
a
2 , y
p
2) it holds that
U ′′2 (y)
U ′2(y)
+ 2
V ′′1 (y)
V ′1(y)
≥ −
V ′1(y)
V1(y
p
1)− V1(y)
. (10)
Under the conditions stated in Proposition 6 the optimal incentive compatible 2–
proposal rule that we characterized in Proposition 4 is generally optimal.
We now turn to the restriction in the setting with direct communication, where we
focused on one round of communication by the agent only. At first sight this seems
innocuous, because only the agent has private information and there is nothing to learn
from the principal.22 However, Forges (1990) shows that even with one–sided asymmetric
21Note that the conditions are satisfied for any function U2 if V
′′′
1
= 0 and V ′′′
2
≥ 0. E.g., a quadratic
Vi.
22Indeed, if only the agent sends messages, Bester and Strausz (2001) demonstrate that there is no
loss of generality in restricting attention to one round of communication and requiring that the agent
sends only messages about his type.
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information players may benefit from multiple rounds of communication with the follow-
ing alternating structure. In odd–numbered rounds the agent reveals some information
and in even–numbered rounds the principal and agent send messages simultaneously.
Aumann and Hart (2003) explain that the simultaneous messages enable players to use
joint lotteries to coordinate their behavior. More specifically, Krishna and Morgan (2004)
demonstrate in the setting of Sobel and Crawford (1982) that with only two such alter-
nating rounds of communication players can already reach a Pareto superior equilibrium
outcome. The joint lotteries in Krishna and Morgan thereby partition the set of types
in smaller subsets. Hence, their example is not applicable to our model, where there are
only two types of agents. However, since one cannot guarantee that joint lotteries are
not helpful for other reasons, we address the issue explicitly. The problem thereby is that
there is not a general procedure to solve for the equilibrium outcomes.23 Nevertheless,
we may demonstrate that under Condition (10) mediation is strictly optimal even if we
consider multiple stages of communication with jointly controlled lotteries. We start by
noting that any outcome from a multi–stage communication can be implemented via a
mediator.
Consider first communication with a finite number of stages. By Proposition 6 the
unique optimal mediated mechanism induces only the two allocations y∗1 and y
∗
2. Hence,
if there exists an equilibrium with multi–stage direct communication that matches the
payoffs associated with the optimal mediated mechanism, it may not lead to any outcome
other than y∗1 and y
∗
2. Now suppose such a multi–stage communication equilibrium exists,
then by Theorem A of Aumann and Hart (2003) there exists a payoff–equivalent canonical
multi–stage communication rule where in even–numbered periods a joint lottery is played
and in odd–numbered periods the agent sends unilateral signals to the principal. Now
consider the last communication stage, say l, of this equilibrium. If l is even, then the last
stage is a joint lottery. However, a joint lottery by itself does not influence the principal’s
beliefs; it only serves as a substitute for a public random variable.24 Therefore, since
for a given belief the principal’s response is unique, the joint lottery is inconsequential
and there exists a payoff–equivalent canonical equilibrium with l − 1 stages. It follows
that if there exists an equilibrium with finitely many stages of direct communication that
matches the payoffs associated with the optimal mediated mechanism, then there exists a
payoff equivalent canonical equilibrium with k stages, where k is odd. Now if k > 1, there
23Aumann and Hart (2003) take an important step towards such a procedure, but their framework is
only capable of handling fully specified settings. See also Krishna (2004) for an application of Aumann
and Hart (2003) to specific settings of cheap talk.
24See, for example, Forges (1990).
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exists a stage k−1 where the principal and the agent play a joint lottery. But independent
of the outcome of this lottery the principal must after a subsequent signal of the agent
in stage k either choose y∗1 or y
∗
2. Due to her unique response function y(.), the agent’s
signal in the final stage k must for either outcome of the joint lottery induce identical
belief systems. Hence, the previous joint lottery at k − 1 is inconsequential and may
be dispensed with, and there exists an equivalent canonical equilibrium with only k − 2
alternating stages. Repeating this argument shows that if there exists an equilibrium with
multi–stage direct communication that matches the payoffs associated with the optimal
mediated mechanism, then there exists one with only one round. Yet, by Theorem 1
this is not the case. It follows that there does not exist an equilibrium with multi–stage
communication that is payoff equivalent to the optimal mediated mechanism.25
Consider now communication with an infinite number of stages. In this case the
obvious advantage of a mediator is that he may implement the outcome in a single
period rather than an infinite amount of time. Indeed, if one introduces a discount factor
to reflect the cost of delay, then it is immediate that a mediator is strictly beneficial
under the conditions of Theorem 1.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we studied mediation in a model of cheap talk. As is well known, cheap talk
is helpful only if there exists both a conflict and some shared interest between the two
players. We introduced the ex ante probability pi as a measure of this shared interest and
showed that mediation enlarges the range for which information revelation can be induced
in equilibrium. Moreover, for a fixed degree of shared interest, i.e. a fixed pi, mediation
increases the amount of information that can be revealed in equilibrium. These two
effects may lead to a demand for mediators in situations of conflict.
We close this paper with a discussion about the generality and possible extensions of
our framework:
Imperfect commitment and an ”underrevelation” principle — We provided
an intuition for our results by stressing the inability of commitment by the principal.
Indeed, with full commitment a mediator is not helpful, since the principal can simply
25Effectively, our argument exploits the fact that multiple stages are only helpful if they induce addi-
tional allocations. However, the proof of Proposition 6 shows that there is a better mediation equilibrium
with only two allocations.
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commit herself to any behavior of the mediator. The inability to commit is the princi-
pal’s central problem. It leads her to respond myopically to a supply of information, thus
discouraging the agent to reveal himself. Under imperfect commitment partial revelation
requires an underrevelation of the compatible type even though this type is by defini-
tion willing to reveal himself truthfully. An underrevelation of the compatible type is
nevertheless required to provide cover for the other type so that the latter is never fully
exposed.26 This requirement restricts the potential to communicate, with or without
mediator, and leads to inefficiencies, which are smaller when a mediator is available.
A mediator alleviates the principal’s commitment problem to some degree. Yet, the
enhanced commitment is rather subtle. It does not address the commitment problem
directly, as also with a mediator the principal reacts myopically to information. Instead,
the enhanced commitment is found in the way the principal can process information.
With a mediator it is as if the principal is able to commit to a specific garbling of
information before acting upon it. This she cannot do without a mediator, since to apply
the correct garbling probabilities the agent’s type must be known.
The mediator as an economic agent — According to Smith (1995) ”One of the
hallmarks of mediation, and one of its important advantages, is mediation’s generally
private, confidential nature. Mediation’s confidentiality may be one of the main reasons
for its success in creating settlements. Parties are often unwilling to disclose confidential
information about their view of the case to the opposing party during direct negotiation.
Perhaps they intend to use the information for the first time at trial, or perhaps disclosure
would be harmful to the party who possesses the information.” Following Smith and taking
the mediator’s trustworthiness for granted we showed that his services are beneficial.27
Indeed, since the mediator has no stake in the game he has no incentive to diverge
from the communication rule and sticking to it is incentive compatible. Yet, this is of
course a rather limited treatment of the mediator as an economic agent and may become
problematic if there exists, for example, a computational cost with following the optimal
communication rule. More importantly, there exist collusive pressures once the mediator
has obtained the agent’s private information. In exchange for a small bribe the principal
may ask the mediator to reveal more information than the communication rule prescribes.
Empirical observation indicates that the success of mediation depends indeed on the
reputation and fairness of the mediator. In practice formal procedures of mediation are
26Bester and Strausz (2001) show that partial information revelation is a general feature of optimal
mechanisms in contracting problems with imperfect commitment.
27See Brown and Ayres (1994, p.324–325) for additional references concerning the importance of private
”caucusing” for the success of mediation.
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structured to guarantee confidentiality. For instance, the formal mediation procedure of
the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) states:
Article 10 Confidentiality and Privacy
10.1 All mediation sessions shall be private, and shall be attended only by the mediator,
the parties and those individuals identified pursuant to Article 5.4.
10.2 The mediation process and all negotiations, and statements and documents pre-
pared for the purposes of the mediation, shall be confidential and covered by ”without
prejudice” or negotiation privilege.
10.3 The mediation shall be confidential. Unless agreed among the parties, or required
by law, neither the mediator nor the parties may disclose to any person any information
regarding the mediation or any settlement terms, or the outcome of the mediation.
10.4 All documents or other information produced for or arising in relation to the
mediation will be privileged and will not be admissible in evidence or otherwise discover-
able in any litigation or arbitration in connection with the dispute referred to mediation,
except for any documents or other information which would in any event be admissible
or discoverable in any such litigation or arbitration.
10.5 There shall be no formal record or transcript of the mediation.
Yet, we want to emphasize that the mediator may be given strict incentives to follow
the communication rule in a repeated version of our static model. More specifically,
consider a dynamic model in which in each period a different principal and agent apply for
the mediator’s help and pay a fee for his services. In such a setting the recommendations
are imperfect signals in the sense of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) about the
mediator’s action. We conjecture that a reputation equilibrium exists that sustains the
truthful behavior of the mediator.
More general situations of conflict — By modeling the situation of conflict as a
simple game of cheap talk with two types, we were able to derive the optimal mechanisms
under mediation and non–mediation explicitly. In more complicated settings the analysis
of optimal mechanisms becomes rather involved. Laffont and Tirole (1993, p.377) claim
for instance that ”the lack of commitment in repeated adverse–selection situations leads to
substantial difficulties for contract theory”. Yet, given our intuition we expect to obtain
a similar beneficial role for a mediator for more complicated models of conflict. As soon
as the optimal non–mediated contract involves partial information revelation, a mediator
may improve outcomes, e.g. Bester and Strausz (2003). As shown in Bester and Strausz
(2001) partial information revelation is a typical feature of mechanism design models with
imperfect commitment (see also Hart and Tirole 1988 and Laffont and Tirole 1988,1990).
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Mutually beneficial mediation — In this paper we assumed that the principal has
all bargaining power. As a result she could dictate the use of a mediator without con-
sidering its effect on the agent. Indeed, comparing the respective equilibrium outcomes,
the incompatible agent always prefers the equilibrium without mediator. Consequently,
the beneficial effect of the mediator occurs partly at the expense of the agent. Although
this setting may be applicable in some situations, in many settings the use of mediators
requires the consent of both parties. A proper analysis of mutually beneficial mediation
is however more complicated, since the agent’s decision to accept or reject a mediator
may be interpreted as a signal about the agent’s type and therefore out–of–equilibrium
beliefs will play a role.
To see this, suppose ya1 < y
p
1 such that pi1 = 0. In this case, type 1 prefers the outcome
with a mediator, while type 2 does not. Rejecting mediation may therefore be interpreted
as revealing that the agent is of type 2, leading to a choice y = yp2 which type 2 finds worse
than the mediation equilibrium outcome y = y(pi2). Consequently, an equilibrium exists
in which mediation occurs. This equilibrium depends on the out–of–equilibrium belief
that the agent is of type 2 if mediation is rejected. Similarly, there exists an equilibrium
in which mediation is rejected, which depends on the out–of–equilibrium belief that only
the agent of type 2 accepts it.28 This illustrates the additional problems that arise when
the agent has a more active role than just sending messages.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The statement follows directly from
U1(y2)− U1(y1) =
∫ y2
y1
U ′1(y)dy <
∫ y2
y1
U ′2(y)dy = U2(y2)− U2(y1).
Proof of Lemma 2
First, note that y(ρ) is implicitly defined by the first order condition
(1− ρ)V ′1(y(ρ)) + ρV
′
2(y(ρ)) = 0. (11)
Let y < min{yp1, y
p
2}, then due to concavity of Vi it follows Vi(y) < 0. Therefore, there
does not exist a ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that (11) is satisfied for some y(ρ) < min{yp1, y
p
2}. Likewise,
let y > max{yp1, y
p
2}, then Vi(y) > 0. Hence, there does not exist a ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that
(11) is satisfied for some y(ρ) > max{yp1, y
p
2}.
28A refinement on out–of–equilibrium may select the equilibrium leading to mediation.
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To prove the second statement differentiate (11) w.r.t. ρ to obtain ∂y/∂ρ = [V ′1(y)−
V ′2(y)]/[(1 − ρ)V
′′
1 (y) + ρV
′′
2 (y)], where y ∈ [min{y
p
1, y
p
2}, max{y
p
1, y
p
2}]. Due to concavity
of Vi the denominator is negative. If y
p
1 < y
p
2 it follows that the numerator is negative
as V1(y) ≤ 0 and V2(y) ≥ 0 with at least one strict inequality for all min y
p
1, y
p
2 ≤ y ≤
max yp1, y
p
2]. Hence, y
′(ρ) is positive. If yp1 > y
p
2, the numerator is positive and y(ρ) is
decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 1
Claim 2 trivial. To prove claim 1 we show that if yp1 > y
p
2 then the optimal mechanism
exhibits y1 = y2. First, we show that a direct mechanism with y1 > y2 is not incentive
compatible. Obviously, at least one IC is binding at the optimum. If this is type 1 it
follows from 0 = U1(y1) − U1(y2) =
∫ y1
y2
U ′1(y) dy <
∫ y1
y2
U ′2(y) dy = U2(y1) − U2(y2) that
the mechanism is not incentive compatible for agent 2. Similarly, if agent 2’s incentive
constraint is binding, it follows from 0 = U2(y1)−U2(y2) =
∫ y1
y2
U ′2(y) dy >
∫ y1
y2
U ′1(y) dy =
U1(y1)− U1(y2) that the mechanism is not incentive compatible for type 1.
Now suppose y1 < y2 and compare the principal’s utility from this mechanism with
that from the optimal pooling mechanism y¯ = y(pi) ∈ (yp2, y
p
1):
∆V ≡ (1− pi)[V1(y1)− V1(y¯)] + pi[V2(y2)− V2(y¯)] =
∫ y1
y¯
(1− pi)V ′1(y) dy +
∫ y2
y¯
piV ′2(y) dy
<
∫ y1
y¯
(1− pi)V ′1(y¯) dy +
∫ y2
y¯
piV ′2(y¯) dy <
∫ y1
y¯
[(1− pi)V ′1(y¯) + piV
′
2(y¯)] dy = 0.
The first inequality follows from the concavity of Vi and the second because V
′
2(y¯) < 0 and
y1 < y2 imply
∫ y1
y2
V ′2(y¯)dy > 0. The final equality follows from the first order condition
determining y(pi).
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose agent 1 is incompatible and yp1 < y
p
2, it then follows from
0 > U1(y
p
2)− U1(y
p
1) =
∫ yp
2
y
p
1
u′1(y)dy >
∫ yp
2
y
p
1
u′2(y)dy = U2(y
p
2)− U2(y
p
1)
that agent 2 is compatible.
Proof of Proposition 2
Note first that the optimal separation mechanism exhibits y∗1 < y
∗
2. Next, note that
at least one agent’s incentive constraint must be binding at the optimum. Lemma 1
then implies that the other agent’s IC has slack. Suppose agent i’s IC binds and define
the function yi2(y) for the range y
∗
1 < y
a
i implicitly by Ui(y1) = Ui(y
i
2(y)). Hence, y
∗
1
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maximizes (1−pi)V1(y)+piV2(y
i
2(y)) and satisfies the first order condition (1−pi)V
′
1(y
∗
1) =
−piV ′2(y
i
2(y
∗
1))∂y
i
2(y
∗
1)/∂y. Since ∂y
i
2(y)/∂y < 0, it follows that y
∗
1 and y
∗
2 are such that
Sign(V ′1(y
∗
1)) = Sign(V
′
2(y
∗
2)). Consequently, either y
∗
1 < y
p
1 and y
∗
2 < y
p
2 or y
∗
1 > y
p
1 and
y∗2 > y
p
2. But since agent 2 is incompatible while agent 1 is compatible, there does not
exist a y > yp1 such that y
i
2(y) > y
p
2. We therefore conclude that the optimal separating
mechanism exhibits y∗1 < y
p
1 and y
∗
2 < y
p
2.
To show that the incentive constraint of agent 2 is binding, suppose by contradiction
that agent 1’s IC binds, i.e. (1) is satisfied with equality. Lemma 1 implies that (2)
is strictly satisfied. Now consider a small raise in y∗2 such that inequality (2) remains
satisfied. As established, an optimal contract satisfies y∗1 < y
p
1 < y
∗
2 < y
p
2, which implies
V ′2(y
∗
2) > 0 and U
′
1(y
∗
2) < 0, the raise in y
∗
2 therefore increases the principal’s utility, while
rendering (1) satisfied with strict inequality. Hence, a binding incentive constraint of
agent 2 is not optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3
We first show non–existence of equilibria of the types 1, 3, and 5.
In a full revelation outcome necessarily (α1, α2) = (1, 0). The principal’s beliefs must
therefore satisfy ρ1 = ρ(1, 0) = 0 and ρ2 = ρ(0, 1) = 1 and implement y1 = y(1) = y
p
1
and y2 = y(0) = y
p
2, which due to U2(y
p
2) < U2(y
p
1) contradicts (3). A full revelation
equilibrium does therefore not exist.
A partial revelation equilibrium does not exist, since in such an equilibrium αi ∈ (0, 1)
for both i = 1, 2 and y1 6= y2. By (3) this would require Ui(y1) = Ui(y2) for both i = 1, 2.
Lemma 1 shows this is not possible.
Also a type 2 partially full revelation equilibrium does not exist. Such an equilibrium
exhibits α1 = 1 and 0 < α2 < 1. Consequently, ρ1 = ρ(1, α2) ∈ (0, 1) and ρ2 =
ρ(0, 1 − α2) = 1, which implies y1 ∈ (y
p
1, y
p
2) and y2 = y(0) = y
p
2. Moreover, due to (3)
0 < α2 < 1 requires U2(y1) = U2(y
p
2). However, such a y1 ∈ (y
p
1, y
p
2) does not exist, because
U2(y
p
2) < U2(y
p
1) and the concavity of U2 implies U2(y
p
2) < U2(y) for all y ∈ [y
p
1, y
p
2).
Hence, only two equilibrium candidates are left. The non–revelation equilibrium,
which always exists in the form (α1, α2, ρ1, ρ2, y1, y2) = (α, α, pi, pi, y(pi), y(pi)) with α ∈
(0, 1), and the partially full revelation equilibrium. Obviously, the latter yields the prin-
cipal a higher payoff. However, a type 1 partially full revelation equilibrium exists if
and only if pi < pi1. This follows from the observation that in a type 1 partially full
revelation equilibrium 0 < α1 < 1 and α2 = 0. Consequently, ρ1 = ρ(α1, 0) = 0 and
ρ2 = ρ(1 − α1, 1) < 1, which implies y1 = y(0) = y
p
1 and y2 ∈ (y
p
1, y
p
2). Moreover, due
to (3) 0 < α1 < 1 requires U1(y2) = U1(y
p
1) and thus y2 = y(pi1). This in turn requires
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ρ2 = ρ(1−α1, 1) = pi1 and hence, by (4), α1 = (pi1−pi)/[(1−pi)pi1]. However, α1 must be
non–negative and, in order to have some information revelation, must differ from α2 = 0.
Therefore, an informative equilibrium requires pi < pi1. For its existence it remains to
be checked that α2 = 0 satisfies the incentive constraint (3) of agent 2; this follows from
Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 5
If an incentive compatible communication rule ({1, 2}, R, α1, α2) induces information rev-
elation then there is some rj ∈ R with α1j 6= α2j. Since
∑
α1j =
∑
α2j = 1, there exist
rj, rk ∈ R with α1j > α2j and α1k < α2k. Incentive compatibility of a recommendation
rj implies Sign(α2j − α1j) = Sign(rj − y(pi)), i.e. rj and rk satisfy rk > y(pi) > rj.
If pi ≥ pi2 it follows U2(y(pi)) ≤ U2(y
p
1). Consequently, due to the concavity of U2,
α2j > α1j implies U2(rj) < U2(y(pi)), while α2j < α1j implies U2(rj) > U2(y(pi)). It
therefore follows that
∑
j(α2j −α1j)U2(rj) =
∑
j max{α2j −α1j, 0}U2(rj)−
∑
j max{α1j −
α2j, 0}U2(rj) <
∑
j max{α2j − α1j, 0}U2(y(pi))−
∑
j max{α1j − α2j, 0}U2(y(pi)) = 0, con-
tradicting the incentive compatibility condition (8). Therefore if an incentive compatible
rule P induces information revelation, then necessarily pi < pi2.
To prove the second statement note first that for i = 1, 2:
|R|∑
j=1
(α1j − α2j)Ui(rj) =
|R|−1∑
j=1

 j∑
k=1
α1k −
j∑
k=1
α2k

 [Ui(rj)− Ui(rj+1)].
Due to (5), one has
∑j
k=1 α1k −
∑j
k=1 α2k > 0 for all j = 1, . . . , |R| − 1. Hence, by the
monotonicity assumption and recalling that rj ≤ rj+1,
|R|∑
j=1
(α1j − α2j)U1(rj) = −
|R|−1∑
j=1

 j∑
k=1
α1k −
j∑
k=1
α2k

 ∫ rj+1
rj
U ′1(y) dy
> −
|R|−1∑
j=1

 j∑
k=1
α1k −
j∑
k=1
α2k

 ∫ rj+1
rj
U ′2(y) dy =
|R|∑
j=1
(α1j − α2j)U2(rj).
Therefore, if (7) holds with equality, (8) is satisfied with strict inequality and vice versa.
For the third statement, note that if pi < pi2 then for all rl < y(pi) it holds U2(rl) ≥
U2(y(pi)). Now suppose that for all rk > y(pi) it holds rk = y
p
2, then U2(rk) < U2(y
p
1)
for all k such α2k > α1k. It follows
∑
j(α2j − α1j)U2(rj) =
∑
j max{α2j − α1j, 0}U2(rj)−∑
j max{α1j−α2j, 0}U2(rj) <
∑
j max{α2j−α1j, 0}U2(y(pi))−
∑
j max{α1j−α2j, 0}U2(y(pi)) =
0, contradicting the incentive compatibility condition (8). Therefore if an incentive
compatible rule P induces information revelation, then there exists an rj such that
y(pi) < rj < y
p
2.
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Proof of Lemma 6
Consider a communication rule P with some recommendation rk such that rk ∈ (y
p
1, y
p
2).
Define, for δ > 0 but small, the proposal P kl(δ) as the following transformation of P :
α1k(δ) ≡ α1k − δα1l α2k(δ) ≡ α2k − δα2l rk(δ) ≡ y(ρ(α1k(δ), α2k(δ)))
α1l(δ) ≡ α1l + δα1l α2l(δ) ≡ α2l + δα2l rl(δ) = rl
α1j(δ) ≡ α1j α2j(δ) ≡ α2j rj(δ) = rj for j 6= k, l.
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The transformation is structured in such a way that if the recommendations of the original
proposal P are incentive compatible then this also holds for the recommendations in
P kl(δ). Moreover, if δ rises, the pair (rk(δ), rl) becomes more informative, since |rk(δ)−rl|
is increasing in δ due to Sign(∂rk/∂δ) = Sign(α1lα2k − α1kα2l). It suffices to show that
dV (P kl)/dδ > 0. To see this note first that, since rule P is incentive compatible it holds
for any rj ∈ R
(1− ρj)V
′
1(rj) + ρjV
′
2(rj) = 0, (12)
where ρj = ρ(α1j, α2j). Moreover the concavity of V1 and V2 imply that
Sign(rj − y) = Sign((1− ρj)V
′
1(y) + ρjV
′
2(y)). (13)
Using (12) one obtains
dV (P kl(δ))
dδ
= (1− pi)α1l[V1(rl)− V1(rk)] + piα2l[V2(rl)− V2(rk)]
= (piα2l + (1− pi)α1l)
∫ rl
rk
(1− ρl)V
′
1(y) + ρlV
′
2(y) dy > 0
where the sign follows from (13).
Proof of Proposition 4
Since agent 2 is incompatible, full revelation is not possible so that at least one incentive
constraint must be binding. By Lemma 1 at most one incentive constraint is binding when
some information revelation occurs. Since Ui(y
p
1) > Ui(y
p
2) for both i, a binding incentive
constraint implies that in an equilibrium with some information revelation r1 < r2 < y
p
2
and thus α21 < α11 < 1.
Now suppose an incentive compatible communication rule P is such that agent 1’s
incentive constraint is binding, i.e. U1(r1) = U1(r2) and U
′
1(r2) < 0. Feasibility requires
moreover ya1 > y
p
1. Consider the communication rule P
21(δ) as defined in the proof of
Lemma 6. Note that for δ > 0 small enough the communication rule P 21(δ) is feasible and
prescribes the incentive compatible recommendations r1(δ) = r1 and r2(δ) > r2. We now
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show that the communication rule P 21(δ) with δ > 0 remains incentive compatible with
respect to both agents. Recall that P 21(0) = P is such that the incentive compatibility
constraint of agent 2 is slack. Due to continuity the constraint remains slack for a
communication rule P 21(δ) with δ > 0 small enough. Note furthermore that for δ > 0
one has r2(δ) > r2, and since U
′
1(r2) < 0, one obtains U1(r1) = U1(r2) > U1(r2(δ)).
Therefore, if P is incentive compatible, then also P 21(δ) for δ > 0 small enough. Since by
Lemma 6 the principal’s utility increases with δ > 0, a communication rule P = P 21(0)
for which U1(r1) = U1(r2) cannot be optimal.
Now suppose P is such that the incentive constraint of agent 2 is binding and α21 > 0.
Consider the communication rule P 12(δ) with δ > 0. Using the same argument as above,
P 12(δ) remains incentive compatible for δ > 0 small enough and increases the principal’s
utility. Hence, a communication rule P with a binding incentive constraint of agent 2
and α21 > 0 cannot be optimal. We therefore conclude that the optimal 2–proposal
rule P is characterized by a binding incentive constraint of agent 2 and α21 = 0. This
implies (y1, y2) = (y
p
1, y(pi2)) which in turn implies ρ(1 − α11, 1) = pi2 and hence, by (4),
α11 = (pi2−pi)/[(1−pi)pi2]. However, α11 must be non–negative and, in order to have some
information revelation, must differ from α21 = 0. Therefore, an informative equilibrium
requires pi < pi2, which obviously requires pi2 > 0.
Proof of Theorem 1
We prove that for yp1 > y
p
2 no information revelation can occur in equilibrium. The
Theorem then follows directly from Lemma 5 and Proposition 4. Let yp1 > y
p
2 and suppose
an incentive compatible proposal rule exists that induces some information revelation,
i.e. P ∗ is such that α1j > α2j for at least some j = 1, . . . , |R|. Due to (5), one has∑j
k=1 α1k −
∑j
k=1 α2k ≥ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , |R| − 1 with at least one strict inequality.
Due to Lemma 2 incentive compatibility of the recommendations require rj ≥ rj+1 with
at least one strict inequality. Hence, by using (12) and the monotonicity assumption, it
follows
|R|∑
j=1
(α1j − α2j)U1(rj) =
|R|−1∑
j=1

 j∑
k=1
α1k −
j∑
k=1
α2k

 ∫ rj
rj+1
U ′1(y) dy
<
|R|−1∑
j=1

 j∑
k=1
α1k −
j∑
k=1
α2k

 ∫ rj
rj+1
U ′2(y) dy =
|R|∑
j=1
(α1j − α2j)U2(rj). (14)
From (14) it follows that if a proposal rule is incentive compatible w.r.t. type 1 it is
not incentive compatible w.r.t. type 2 and vice versa. Therefore an incentive compatible
proposal rule that induces some information revelation does not exist.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Assume pi < pi2, i.e. y
a
2 > y
p
1. It follows from Theorem 1 that the optimal communication
rule induces some amount of information revelation. Since full revelation is not possible
some, and by Lemma 5 one, incentive constraint is binding at the optimum.
For some rk, rl ∈ R with rk ∈ (y
p
1, y
p
2) consider the transformation P
kl as defined in
the proof of Lemma 6. In order to evaluate the impact of the transformation on the
incentive constraints, define the functions
fkli (δ) ≡
|R|∑
j=1
[α1j(δ)− α2j(δ)]Ui(rj(δ))−
|R|∑
j=1
[α1j − α2j]Ui(rj)
= δ(α1l − α2l)[Ui(rl)− Ui(rk(δ))] + (α1k − α2k)[Ui(rk(δ))− Ui(rk)]. (15)
Now consider the derivative of f kli (δ) evaluated at δ = 0:
dfkli (0)
dδ
= (α1l − α2l)[Ui(rl)− Ui(rk)] + (α1k − α2k)U
′
i(rk)r
′
k(0), (16)
where
Sign (r′k(0)) = Sign(α1lα2k − α1kα2l) = Sign(rk − rl). (17)
For statement (i), suppose by contradiction that P is such that agent 1’s IC binds
which is only feasible if ya1 > y
p
1. An incentive compatible communication rule P that
induces information revelation contains a pair (rk, rl) such that y
p
2 > rk > y(pi) > rl, by
statement 3 of Lemma 5. Incentive compatibility implies α1k < α2k, α1l > α2l, while (17)
implies r′k(0) > 0.
If U1(rk) ≤ U1(rl), it follows, due to rk > rl, that rk > y
a
1 . Consequently, U
′
1(rk) < 0.
These properties imply df kl1 (0)/dδ > 0, which means that agent 1’s IC (7) remains satisfied
for small δ > 0. Agent 2’s IC is also satisfied since, for δ = 0, it has slack. Hence, there
exists a δ > 0 for which the transformation P kl(δ) is feasible. By Lemma 6 such a P is
not optimal.
Now consider the case U1(rk) > U1(rl), which due to rk > rl implies rl < y
a
1 . If there
exists an ε > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, ε) it holds that f kl1 (δ) ≥ 0, then P is not optimal
by the above argument. If such an ε does not exist, then f kl1 (δ) < 0 for δ sufficiently close
to zero. But then there exists a δˆ > 0 such that f kl1 (δˆ) = 0. This follows from continuity
of fkl1 (δ) and the fact that there exists a δ
′ > 0 such that U1(rk(δ
′)) = U1(rl), which
implies fkl1 (δ
′) > 0. The transformation P kl(δˆ) is feasible because, due to f kl1 (δˆ) = 0,
agent 1’s IC still holds in equality, which, by Lemma 5, implies that also agent 2’s IC is
satisfied. Since δˆ > 0, Lemma 6 implies that P is not optimal. It therefore cannot be
optimal to have agent 1’s IC bind. Hence, at the optimum agent 2’s IC binds.
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For the remainder of the proof consider an incentive compatible communication rule
P that induces some revelation of information and for which agent 2’s IC binds. For
statement (ii), let now rk < y(pi) < rl, which implies α1k > α2k, α1l < α2l, and, by (17),
r′k(0) < 0. Assume by contradiction that rk > y
p
1.
If U2(rk) ≤ U2(rl), it follows, due to rk < rl, that rk < y
a
2 . Consequently, U
′
2(rk) > 0.
These properties imply df kl2 (0)/dδ < 0, which means that agent 2’s IC (8) is satisfied for
small δ > 0. For δ > 0 but small also agent 1’s IC remains satisfied, since, for δ = 0,
it has slack. Hence, there exists a δ > 0 for which the transformation P kl(δ) is feasible.
Lemma 6 implies that P is not optimal.
Now consider the case U2(rk) > U2(rl), which due to rk < rl implies rl > y
a
2 . If there
exists an ε > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, ε) it holds that f kl2 (δ) ≤ 0, then P is not optimal
by the above argument. If such an ε does not exist, then f kl2 (δ) > 0 for δ sufficiently
close to zero. But then there exists a δˆ > 0 such that f kl2 (δˆ) = 0. This follows from
continuity of f kl2 (δ) and the fact that there exists a δ
′ > 0 such that U2(rk(δ
′)) = U2(rl),
which implies f kl2 (δ
′) < 0. The transformation P kl(δˆ) is feasible because agent 2’s IC
still holds in equality which, by Lemma 5, implies that agent 1’s still has slack. Since
δˆ > 0, Lemma 6 implies that P is not optimal. Thus it is never optimal to have an
rk ∈ (y
p
1, y(pi)). Since there must be an rk < y(pi), we conclude that an optimal incentive
compatible recommendation rule exhibits r1 = y
p
1 and rj ≥ y(pi) for all j > 1.
For statement (iii), consider an optimal P , i.e. P exhibits r1 = y
p
1 and rj ≥ y(pi) for
all j > 1. Now consider the transformation P k1(δ) with k > 1. Since α21 = 0, it follows
dfk12 (0)
dδ
= α11[U2(y
p
1)− U2(rk)] + (α1k − α2k)U
′
2(rk)r
′
k(0), (18)
and since rk > r1 = y
p
1 it holds r
′
k(0) > 0. Now if y(pi) ≤ y
a
2 and P contains an
rk ∈ [y(pi), y
a
2 ], then U
′
2(rk) ≥ 0 and α1k ≤ α2k. Moreover, U2(y
p
1) < U2(rk) and it follows
that (18) is negative. Hence, for some small δ > 0 the transformation P k1(δ) is feasible
and yields the principal more. Consequently, P is not optimal. If ya2 < y(pi) and P
contains an rk = y(pi), then α1k = α2k. Since pi < pi2 implies U2(y(pi)) > U2(y
p
1), it
follows that (18) is negative and P is suboptimal.
Proof of Proposition 6
We must prove that an incentive compatible communication rule with |R| > 2 and rj 6= rk
for all k 6= j cannot be optimal. Suppose by contradiction that such a P is optimal, then
by Proposition 5 it satisfies r1 = y
p
1 and max{y(pi), y
a
2} < r2 < r3 ≤ y
p
2. Moreover, since
agent 2’s incentive constraint binds at the optimum, it holds that r2 < y(pi2) and there
must also exist an r3 > y(pi2). This implies U2(r2) > U2(y
p
1) > U2(r3).
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Denote by P (δ2, δ3) the proposal rule which results from a joint transformation P
21(δ2),
P 31(δ3), as defined in the proof of Lemma 6. Write as V (δ2, δ3) the principal’s payoff as-
sociated with P (δ2, δ3). Its partial derivative with respect to δj evaluated at δ2 = δ3 = 0
is
∂V (0, 0)
∂δj
= (1− pi)α11[V1(y
p
1)− V1(rj)].
The principal’s marginal gain from a joint transformation with δ3 = δ3(δ2) = −βδ2 with
β > 0 is therefore
dV (δ2, δ3(δ2))
dδ2
∣∣∣∣∣
δ2=0
=
∂V (0, 0)
∂δ2
−
∂V (0, 0)
∂δ3
β
= (1− pi)α11[V1(y
p
1)− V1(r2)− β(V1(y
p
1)− V1(r3))]. (19)
To evaluate the impact of a marginal change of P (0, 0) on the incentive constraint of
agent 2 define
F (δ2, δ3) = f
21
2 (δ2) + f
31
2 (δ3).
Recalling (18) and using δ3(δ2) = −βδ2 the total derivative of F (δ2, δ3(δ2)) evaluated at
δ2 = 0 is:
dF (0, 0)
dδ2
=
∂F (0, 0)
∂δ2
−
∂F (0, 0)
∂δ3
β
= α11[U2(y
p
1)− U2(r2)]− (α22 − α12)U
′
2(r2)r
′
2(0)
− β (α11[U2(y
p
1)− U2(r3)]− (α23 − α13)U
′
2(r3)r
′
3(0))
= α11
{
[U2(y
p
1)− U2(r2)]− U
′
2(r2)y
′(ρ2)ρ2
ρ2 − pi
pi
− β
(
[U2(y
p
1)− U2(r3)]− U
′
2(r3)y
′(ρ3)ρ3
ρ3 − pi
pi
)}
(20)
where the last equation follows from r′j(0) = y
′(ρj)ρ
′
j(0) and ρ
′
j(0)(α2j − α1j)/α11 =
ρj(ρj − pi)/pi with
ρj(δj) ≡ ρ(α1j(δj), α2j(δj)).
A marginal change of P satisfies incentive compatibility of agent 2 if (20) is negative, i.e.
if
β ≥
[U2(y
p
1)− U2(r2)]− U
′
2(r2)y
′(ρ2)ρ2
ρ2−pi
pi
[U2(y
p
1)− U2(r3)]− U
′
2(r3)y
′(ρ3)ρ3
ρ3−pi
pi
.
By (19) a marginal change of P (weakly) increases the principal’s utility if
β ≤
V1(y
p
1)− V1(r2)
V1(y
p
1)− V1(r3)
.
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Thus, a marginal change of P which (weakly) increases the principal’s utility while leaving
the rule incentive compatible exists, if
V1(y
p
1)− V1(r2)
V1(y
p
1)− V1(r3)
≥
[U2(y
p
1)− U2(r2)]− U
′
2(r2)y
′(ρ2)ρ2
ρ2−pi
pi
[U2(y
p
1)− U2(r3)]− U
′
2(r3)y
′(ρ3)ρ3
ρ3−pi
pi
(21)
where rj = y(ρj). Since U2(r2) > U2(y
p
1) > U2(r3) and U
′(rj) < 0 < y
′(ρj) and ρ3 > ρ2 >
pi, condition (21) is strictly satisfied for any pi if and only if
D(ρ2) ≤ D(ρ3) (22)
with
D(ρ) ≡
V1(y
p
1)− V1(y(ρ))
U ′2(y(ρ))y
′(ρ)ρ2
. (23)
Therefore, if D(ρ) is weakly increasing a proposal with |R| > 2 is not optimal. Straight-
forward calculations yield that the derivative of D(ρ) is larger or equal to zero when
U ′′2 (y(ρ))
U ′2(y(ρ))
+
2y′(ρ) + ρy′′(ρ)
ρy′(ρ)2
≥ −
V ′1(y(ρ))
∆V (y(ρ))
(24)
with
∆V (y) ≡ V1(y
p
1)− V1(y).
The definition of y(ρ) implies 2y′(ρ) + ρy′′(ρ) = (2V ′′1 (y(ρ))− ρy
′(ρ)b(y(ρ)))y′(ρ)/a(y(ρ))
and ρy′(ρ) = V ′1(y(ρ))/a(y(ρ)) with
a(y) ≡ (1− ρ)V ′′1 (y) + ρV
′′
2 (y) < 0,
b(y) ≡ (1− ρ)V ′′′1 (y) + ρV
′′′
2 (y).
Hence, dropping the dependence on ρ we may rewrite (24) as
U ′′2 (y)
U ′2(y)
+
2V ′′1 (y)
V ′1(y)
−
b(y)
a(y)
≥ −
V ′1(y)
∆V (y)
. (25)
Now if V ′′′1 (y) ≥ 0 and V
′′′
2 (y) ≥ 0 then b(y) ≥ 0 and (25) is satisfied if
U ′′2 (y)/U
′
2(y) + 2V
′′
1 (y)/V
′
1(y) ≥ −V
′
1(y)/∆V (y).
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